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COMMENTARY

The false litigant syndrome:
"Nobody would say that
unless it was the truth"

BY ALAN W. SCHEFLIN, J.D., M.A., LL.M.
AND DANIEL BROWN, PH.D.

I.

False defendants

1. Intro
duction

Thomas Shay, Jr., stood before the jurors, on trial for conspir
acy and for aiding and abetting an attempt to blow u p his
father's car.1 His father had discovered a suspicious black box
on the driveway, which apparently had become dislodged
from the underside of the car. The police were summoned to
the scene, and as the box was being removed, it exploded.
One police officer died and another was severely injured.
The evidence against Shay was quite compelling. In fact, he
not only admitted his guilt, he virtually bragged about it. The
prosecutor was quite happy to introduce Shay's own admis
sions as conclusive proof of his guilt. Substantial physical
evidence supported the truth of the admissions.
Shay, however, stunned the court when he sought to show
that his statements were the product of a disordered mind.
This was not the typical insanity defense plea, which would
have failed because there was no evidence that Shay was
© 2000 by Federal Legal Publications. Inc.
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incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong. To but
tress his plea that his admissions should not be accepted as a
truthful confession, Shay sought to introduce psychiatric evi
dence to prove the extraordinary claim that he was not capa
ble of telling the truth. Shay's defense rested on his ability to
prove that his psychological condition manifested itself in his
uncontrollable impulse to tell whopping lies.
Shay's lawyer attempted to show that his statements were
conflicting, did not match the evidence completely, and were
uttered, in the words of the court, "in order to fulfill a com
pUlsive need for attention even though they were false."
According to the court, the defense "elicited testimony from
several witnesses that Shay Jr. regularly told the same
grandiose stories, often changing significant details each time
he told them; repeatedly sought out the media to talk about
the bombing even though it was not in his interest to do so;
made comments concerning the police investigation which
were not confirmed by the police; and expressed abnormal
interest in the media attention he received as a result of his
statements."
To help explain this defense, Shay's lawyer asked the court to
permit Dr. Robert Phillips, a psychiatrist, to testify that Shay
suffered from a recognized mental disorder known as "pseu
dologia fantastica," a condition that caused Shay
to spin out webs of lies which are ordinarily self-aggrandizing and
serve to place him in the center of attention. Put otherwise, coping
for Mr. Shay, given his personality structure, entails seeking atten
tion, tailoring his words to the audience, creating fantasies in which
he is the central figure, and through which he attempts to enlist his
audience. . . . Mr. Shay's stories are an attempt to draw others
into his fantasy world in order to meet the interpersonal needs
which were not met during his childhood.

The legal question before the district court was whether to
permit Dr. Phillips to testify about this factitious disorder.
The trial judge refused to let the jury hear the psychiatric tes
timony, claiming that the jurors had enough evidence of
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Shay's grandiose statements and fantasies to decide for them
selves whether to believe his admissions were or were not
reliable. The psychiatric testimony, according to the judge's
reasoning, would essentially intrude impermissibly on the
jury's exclusive province of assessing the credibility of wit
nesses.
Shay appealed his conviction to the court of appeals, which
provided him the relief he sought. Concerning the admissibil
ity of the psychiatric testimony, the court noted that it could
be admitted even if it influenced an assessment of credibility.
The cases excluding testimony have been more narrowly
focused-they involved "the more limited proposition that an
expert's opinion that another witness is lying or telling the
truth is ordinarily inadmissible . . . because the opinion
exceeds the scope of the expert's specialized knowledge and
therefore merely informs the jury that it should reach a
particular conclusion." The trial judge could have limited
Dr. Phillips's testimony so that it did not cross over this line.2
Furthermore, the Federal Rules of Evidence, in Rule 608(a),
permit opinion testimony concerning a witness's character.
Thus, in the words of the appellate court, "truthful or untruth
ful character may be proved by expert testimony."
The court of appeals then turned to the factor that the trial
judge found to be crucial: whether the psychiatric testimony
would be beneficially informative to the jury. On the issue of
the factitious disorder, the court was clear that the jury
plainly was unqualified to determine without assistance the particu
lar issue of whether Shay Jr. may have made false statements
against his own interests because he suffered from a mental disor
der. Common understanding conforms to the notion that a person
ordinarily does not make untruthful inculpatory statements. . . .
Dr. Phillips would have testified that, contrary to this common
sense assumption, Shay Jr. suffered from a recognized mental dis
order that caused him to make false statements even though they
were inconsistent with his apparent self-interest. Thus, Dr. Phillips
was prepared to offer specialized opinion testimony, grounded in
his expertise as a psychiatrist, that could have "explode[d] common

HeinOnline -- 27 J. Psychiatry & L. 651 1999

652

THE FALSE LITIGANT SYNDROME

myths" about evidence vital to the government's case. . . . While
the record contains other evidence that Shay Jr. told lies and
boasted to an unusual degree, this evidence, standing alone, is much
less powerful than the psychiatric testimony that Dr. Phillips was
prepared to offer. Moreover, the court did not express any concern
that Dr. Phillips was unqualified or that his testimony was unreli
able because it concerned some novel or ad hoc syndrome.

The case was sent back to the trial judge for an evidentiary
hearing on the admissibility of the testimony of Dr. Phillips
and a possible retrial.
The Shay case may appear an oddity, and indeed it is, in sev
eral ways. Not many litigants argue that they are mentally
prohibited from telling the truth. But the Shay case is impor
tant for what is not rare about it. A court, after careful exami
nation of the law and the psychiatric literature, concluded
that factitious disorders are an appropriate topic for expert
testimony, and that these disorders may be evaluated by juries
in judging the credibility of the litigant.
Although a moderate literature exists on factitious disorders
and their relevance to law, there does not appear to be any
scholarship tracking the variety of forms in which factitious
ness has an impact on the legal system in producing false
litigants. Other papers in this issue provide intense archae
ological-type probings of how the disorder arises and how it
is manifested in behavior.
In this article we intend to focus on the narrow but increas
ingly more significant issue of retractors in malprac
tice actions against therapists. It is generally believed that
people do not make confessions unless they are actually
gUilty. It is also generally believed that retractors who recant
their earlier statements must now be telling the truth. Courts
have allowed expert testimony to be admitted on the issue of
why people will falsely confess. In this paper we argue that
expert testimony on why people falsely recant should also be
admissible.
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Whether Mr. Shay actually committed the offense was not
decided by the court. Mr. Shay is a false defendant, not
because he is necessarily innocent, but rather because a sub
stantial amount of the evidence used to convict him was
supplied by him, and he is an untrustworthy source. His men
tal condition makes him an odd type of false confessor-he is
not to be believed whether he is innocent or is guilty. In that
regard, Mr. Shay's case differs substantially from the more
traditional cases of false confessors with which courts have
dealt over the years.
2. False

confessors

Police departments around the world are plagued with the
problem of false confessions. As judges and lawyers well
know, confessions, like eyewitness testimony/ tend to be
highly persuasive evidence.4 Fact finders, be they juries or
judges, find confession testimony to be almost conclusive
proof of guilt.5 Because the testimony has such an important
impact, false confessions, which result in the imprisonment
and possible execution of an innocent person, raise some of
the most serious problems in the criminal justice system.
The issue of false confessions is not new. The use of torture6
and other interrogation techniques that increase the likelihood
of false confessions was memorialized in the dreaded Malleus
Maleficarum,1 published more than 500 years ago to aid in
the extraction of confessions from accused witches. Despite
its antiquity, the Malleus continues to be important in under
standing current social perspectives.8
During the first half of this century, courts focused on the
ingenious variety of physical tactics used by interrogators to
extract confessions. But by the second half of the century,
judicial emphasis shifted from the "third degree" techniques9
to the "fourth degree" methods using psychological tech
niques of social influence and persuasion 10 and even trickery
and deception.11 Inbau and Reid,12 authors of the most widely
used training manual for police interrogators, have justified
the use of social influence and deception tactics:
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[Interrogations] frequently require the use of psychological tactics
and techniques that could well be classified as "unethical". . .
according to the standards usually set for professional, business
and social conduct, but the pertinent issue [is] no ordinary lawful,
professional or social matter.
[A criminal does not abide by a] code of fair play toward his fellow
human beings. . . . Of necessity, criminal interrogators must deal
with criminal offenders on a somewhat lower moral plane than that
upon which ethical, law-abiding citizens are expected to conduct
their everyday affairs (pp. 207-208).

A more unique justification for deception in interrogation is
suggested by Jayne, 13 who notes the irony that if a criminal
tells the truth and confesses, he is prosecuted and punished,
yet if a criminal is deceptive and lies, he may escape all
responsibility. As Jayne observes, "while society does not
encourage deception, it indirectly rewards successful decep
tion" (p. 328). It is only by making the anxiety of deceiving
more unbearable that the truth can be discovered. According
to Jayne, "an individual will confess (tell the truth) when he
perceives the consequences of a confession as more desirable
than the continued anxiety of deception" (p. 332).
The famous Miranda case,14 known for its mandate that
police read a suspect his or her "Miranda" rights before
beginning an interrogation, was based upon extensive quota
tions from police manuals that described the most effective
techniques for extracting confessions. The justices noted that
"the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psycho
logical rather than physically oriented" (p. 448). The majority
opinion quotes extensively, and disapprovingly, the police
tactics suggested by Inbau and Reid and other text writers.
Inbau and Reid were quick, however, in their response criti
cizing the Court for coddling criminals. IS
Rogge,16 a former assistant United States attorney general,
has chronicled how ancient witch-hunting guides, which later
evolved into police interrogation manuals, formed the basis
for the development of brainwashing techniques. Indeed, in
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one well-established and frequently used text that teaches
police interrogation techniques, the reader will find, under
the heading "brainwashing," the entry that "this is a very
handy device."17
Because jurors believe confessions, expert testimony is nec
essary to demonstrate how people can be led to give false
confessions.18 Modern scholars now distinguish between three
types of false confessions: (1) c oerc ed-c ompliant, whereby
the subject, after a period of intensive or extensive question
ing, confesses to relieve or remove the overwhelming pres
sures generated by the interrogators; (2) c oerc ed-internalized,
whereby the subject, after a period of interrogation, actually
comes to believe that he or she committed the crime and is
therefore guilty; and (3) v oluntary, whereby the subject,
without any interrogation, goes to the police station and con
fesses to a crime he or she did not commit.
Coerc ed
c ompliant
c onfessions

An apt illustration of the coerced-compliant false confession
is the Peter Reilly case, in which police persuaded an impres
sionable young man that he had murdered his mother.19 Reilly
had a deep-seated respect for police authority and was con
fused when he was accused of the murder. He loved his
mother and had no reason to harm her, especially in the brutal
manner that ended her life. The police questioned Reilly quite
rigorously, asking him whether he would want to remember
murdering his mother if he had actually killed her. Peter
acknowledged that he would not want to remember it. The
police then suggested that his failure to remember the crime
was evidence that he had in fact committed it. Over and over
the police carefully described the crime scene and asked
Peter if he had any memories of it. Gradually, as the events
assumed a familiarity because of repetition, and in response
to his personal zeal in respecting figures of authority such as
police officers, Peter said it all seemed like a dream, which
the police interpreted to mean a faint but growing memory.
Peter admitted that the police had no reason to lie to him, and
he was clear that they were persuaded, after reviewing all of
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the evidence, that he had killed his mother. Peter finally said
that he must have killed his mother, because he could not
remember not doing it. He could describe details, which the
police had provided to him, but his confession was more an
abdication than an assumption of responsibility. Memories of
the crime scene assumed a dreamlike quality in his mind,
with the content of those images completely supplied by
police questioners.
After Peter's conviction, the local community rose to his
defense and contacted Dr. Herbert Spiegel, a psychiatrist at
the Columbia University Medical School. Spiegel had
recently developed a test for determining hypnotizability, the
Hypnotic Induction Profile (HIP). The HIP had been recog
nized in the hypnosis literature as a reliable measuring
device. When Spiegel tested Peter, he discovered that Peter
was a high-hypnotizable who could easily have been unduly
influenced by the police questioning. According to the appel
late court that reversed Peter's conviction:
To analyze the plaintiff's confessions and admissions, Spiegel
employed a new profile test that measures the ability of people to
concentrate under given test conditions. Although that test had been
in development over a period of eight years, it was first accepted
in the medical community after the publication of an article by
Professor Ernest Hilgard in the February 1975 issue of Annals of
Psychology. Spiegel was personally involved in the development of
that test as principal investigator. On the basis of the profile test,
Spiegel concluded that the plaintiff's confessions and admissions
were obtained by either coercion or deception, given the plaintiff's
personality and his susceptibility to influence by persons in posi
tions of authority. In his testimony, Spiegel characterized the
plaintiff as "a somewhat immature young man who has a serious
deficit in his ability to identify who he is as a person. . . . As a
result of this, he had difficulty in integrating his concept of self,
and at the same time, has confusion and difficulty and a poor ability
to integrate his conceptions of others; and this combination of being
so terribly uncertain about who he is as a person and who he is
relating to, especially people in authority, leads to a great deal of
confusion and, certainly, a great deal of difficulty in trying to
withstand any efforts at interrogation and to make critical judg
ments about the difference between a statement and an assertion or
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a question. . . . [H]e can easily be confused; and he most certainly
can easily accept as a fact something that he knows nothing about."

Because the objective test developed by Spiegel was not
available to Reilly at the time of his trial, the court found in
favor of the admissibility of Spiegel's testimony at a new
trial. The rationale given by the court was similar to the
reasoning in the Shay case:
The confessions and admissions went totally unexplained except in
the testimony of the plaintiff himself. Since the confessions and
admissions were an important element of the state's case against
the plaintiff, it is reasonably probable that a jury would accept
Spiegel's testimony and that such testimony would probably lead to
a different result upon a new trial.

Peter was ultimately set free after all charges against him
were dropped. The incredible story of his ordeal is captured
in a fascinating book by Donald Connery, G uilty Until
Prov en Innoc ent.2o The use of Spiegel's testimony is consid
ered a landmark event in the law of confessions21 and in the
area of forensic hypnosis.22
Wrightsman and Kassin23 identify the Bradley Page case24 as
an illustration of the coerced-compliant type of false confes
sion. They note that "For apparently the first time a social
psychologist was allowed to testify about social influence and
coercion in the interrogation room."
On November 4, 1984, Bradley Page, a college undergradu
ate, went jogging with his girlfriend, Roberta "Bibi" Lee, and
their friend Robin Shaw. Lee became separated from the
other two joggers and disappeared. The ensuing search
attracted substantial local media attention. A month after her
disappearance, Lee's body was found near where she had
been running with her friends. The next day, Page was ques
tioned by the police for several hours. He ultimately con
fessed that he had struck Lee and left her unconscious in the
woods. He also admitted he had gone back to the scene of the
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crime that night, where he had sex with her dead body and
buried her using a hubcap from his car. However, as soon as
this confession was uttered, it was almost immediately
retracted. Page blamed the confession on police coercion and
his own guilt and confusion about letting Lee jog away by
herself.
In his first trial, the jury acquitted Page of first and second
degree murder, but could not reach a verdict on the charge of
voluntary manslaughter. In the second trial, the jury con
victed Page of voluntary manslaughter. On appeal, Page con
tended that the manslaughter conviction must be reversed
because the trial court improperly restricted a defense
expert's testimony on the psychological factors that allegedly
caused Page to give a false confession.
According to the trial testimony, the case investigators,
Sergeants Harris and Lacer, began questioning Page in a win
dowless interview room at 10:12 a.m. Page was advised of
and waived his Miranda rights. The officers then questioned
him for approximately one hour, asking general questions
about his relationship with Bibi Lee, their time at school
together, and the events that occurred on the morning she dis
appeared. According to Sergeant Harris, this initial interview
was not meant to be "probing."
At the end of the initial interview, Harris left the interro
gation room to get a tape recorder. He returned after about
20 minutes, and at 11:50 a.m. began taking the first of four
taped statements from Page.
In this first taped statement, Page explained how he had met
Bibi, and said they had been in love with each other. When he
met Bibi in the morning to go running, he claimed she
seemed upset to the point of being irrational. During the drive
up to Redwood Park, the mood in the car was "painful." Dur
ing the run, Bibi was silent and trailed behind Page and
Shaw. Page remembered last seeing Bibi at the main drive-
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way in Redwood Park. He ran about 100 more yards, looked
back, and noticed she wasn't there. He and Robin looked for
Bibi in the Redwood Park area, and when they did not find
her, they ran back to the car to see if she had returned there.
They waited at the car for five or ten minutes, and then Page
drove around the area while Shaw waited where the car had
been parked. Page drove throughout the area, but he never
stopped, got out of the car, called Bibi's name, or honked his
horn. The entire search took about 15 minutes. Page con
vinced Shaw to leave without Bibi, telling her he knew Bibi
better than she did and that it was his decision. Page did not
tell anyone about how Bibi had disappeared, but he did tell
the officers that Bibi had once before stormed away and then
avoided Page when he attempted to follow her.
The officers repeatedly questioned Page to determine if he
was angry at Bibi for disappearing in the park. Page admitted
he was upset at the "situation" and didn't want to "give into
her." He added that "I told her that I couldn't deal with it the
first time . . . she did it to me . . . so I just figured that I had
to put an end to this kind of behavior sooner or later." Page
specifically denied injuring Bibi.
After Page completed his taped statement at 1:10 p.m.,
Sergeant Harris asked Page if he would submit to a polygraph
examination. Page agreed, and Harris took him to the poly
graph office and introduced him to the polygraph examiner,
Sergeant Furry. Furry administered an examination consisting
of a pretest phase, the actual polygraph questioning, and a
posttest interview. In the pretest phase, Furry explained to
Page how the polygraph worked and told him he would have
to be completely truthful in order to pass the test. During this
phase, Page indicated that he did not know where Bibi's body
was found or what injuries she had received.
After Furry formulated the test questions with Page, he began
the polygraph examination with a "searching peak of tension"
test. In this test, the examiner, without knowing specific
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information about the case, asks a variety of questions to
determine if there is a response. Here, Furry asked Page if he
knew what part of Bibi 's body was injured, listing each
part-legs, head, stomach, etc.-individually. Page was
instructed to answer "no" to each question. Eventually Furry
turned to the "modified general question technique," which
involves asking irrelevant questions mixed in with questions
deemed important to the case. The test measures deception
based on the response to the relevant questions. F urry
repeated this set of questions twice.
As Furry was asking this set of questions a third time, Page
began making crying or "wailing noises" when Furry came to
question number four: Did you yourself physically injure
Bibi on November 4th? Page became so distraught that it was
impossible to continue the test. However, when Furry
removed the polygraph attachments, he noticed that Page did
not exhibit any physical signs of crying.
Sergeant Furry completed two charts for the modified general
question technique before Page broke down. Based on these
charts, Furry concluded that Page had been deceptive in his
responses to question four. As to Page's answers to question
six, regarding whether he had seen Bibi after leaving Skyline
Gate, Furry deemed the data inconclusive. Furry also felt
there had been some response in the "searching peak of ten
sion test" when he had mentioned injury to the head. Overall,
Furry concluded that Page had tested deceptive for the entire
test, and specifically told Page he believed h e had
"attempt[ed] deception" when asked if he had physically
injured Bibi.
Furry told Harris and Lacer he believed Page had been
deceptive during the examination. Page returned to the
interrogation room at 3:15 p.m. and was left alone for about
25 minutes. When Harris returned to the room, Page had his
head in his hands and was making a low moaning or wailing
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sound, and was saying, "I really loved her, but I really loved
her."
After Page composed himself, the officers continued their
questioning. They repeatedly impressed on Page that they
believed he had something to do with Bibi Lee's death. Harris
said their suspicions were based on, among other things, his
failing the polygraph test, only superficially searching for
Bibi when she was first lost, convincing Robin Shaw to
leave, and not telling anyone what had happened when he got
back to Lothlorien. When faced with these accusations, Page
said, "Well, if I did do something, I must have blacked it out.
I might have blacked it out."
The officers again said they believed Page was lying and
didn't buy his "selective amnesia theory." Lacer suggested
that Page close his eyes to try to remember what happened.
Page did so and after a moment said, "I remember hitting and
kicking her, and wailing on her, or going off on her," but
didn't remember when or where this occurred. This admis
sion came at 4:10 p.m., or about six hours after Page had first
come to the police station.
The officers tried to get additional details from Page, but he
claimed that he did not remember any others. The officers
said they did not believe him, and then told him Bibi's body
had been discovered near the area where they had been jog
ging together. The officers did not tell Page precisely where
the body was found or anything about its condition.
About 4:30 p.m., Harris decided to lie to Page by stating that
Page's fingerprints had been found at the crime scene. Harris
used a softening technique, stating that the crime might not
be as serious as Page thought-it might be something less
than cold-blooded murder, such as an accidental killing or a
killing arising from a quarrel. Page still maintained that he
must have blacked out. Shortly before 5 p.m., Harris decided
to put additional pressure on Page by telling him a second lie.
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This time Harris suggested they had a witness who saw
Page's car south of the entrance to Redwood Park. Page
responded that his car had not been down there, at least as far
as he could recall, and that he must have blacked it out.
At 5 p.m. the officers decided to take a break to get some
thing to eat; Lacer went to get food, leaving Harris alone in
the interview room with Page. Harris and Page relaxed in
their chairs, and Page began making casual conversation. He
talked about his relationship with Bibi, how she was much
brighter than he, and mentioned that he was frustrated with
their sexual relationship because she had insisted on coitus
interruptus as their only form of birth control. He also men
tioned that he had a very difficult time after Bibi disappeared.
Lacer returned at 5:30 p.m., and the officers continued their
questioning. They went over their concerns about Page's
story "again and again:' About 10 or 15 minutes into the
resumed interview, Harris told Page he believed he was lying.
Faced with a direct accusation of committing the crime, Page
was silent for a moment. He then said he remembered driving
out of the parking lot to Roberts Park and turning left to go
south on Skyline. He said that as he drove out onto Skyline,
he saw Bibi running or jogging on the opposite side of the
road, coming toward him. Page pulled to the opposite side
and parked in a turnout in front of Bibi. He got out of the car,
took her by the arm, and led her off the road up a little "hill
area." As he led her off into a "tree area" he tried to hug and
kiss her, to talk to her. When Bibi pulled away, Page became
angry and backhanded her, knocking her to the ground. She
fell "kind of around a tree." She seemed to be unconscious
and her nose was bleeding. Page said he left Bibi there and
went home.
Page claimed he drove back up to the same area later that
night between 7 p.m. and 1 a.m. and found Bibi lying by the
tree. He knew she was dead. He got a blanket from his car
and lay down and had sex with her. When he was done, he
moved her body closer to Skyline Boulevard, where he used a
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hubcap to cover her with a layer of dirt, smoothing it over so
as to give her a "decent burial." The officers asked Page to
repeat this story so they could take notes. He did so.
At 7:07 p.m. the officers began taking a second taped state
ment from Page. This time Page related essentially the same
story he had just told the officers. However, many of his
responses seemed somewhat confused, tentative or vague. For
example, when the officers asked Page if he saw Bibi as he
came out of the Roberts Pool parking area, he responded,
"I guess I must of." When asked if he had spoken to her when
he first stopped her, he said, "I must of said something,
I don't know." Page said he couldn't remember being in his
room after 7 p.m., and although he couldn't remember how
he got back to the scene of the killing, he "assumed" he
drove. Page claimed that at the time he drove back to get
Robin Shaw, he did not remember hitting Bibi and did not
know where she was. Despite these indications of imperfect
memory, Page was very specific regarding many of the
details of the assault. Page completed his taped statement at
7:33 p.m. The officers told Page he would be arrested and
held in custody for the murder of Bibi Lee. He then agreed to
speak with a deputy district attorney.
Shortly after 9 p.m., Deputy District Attorney Aaron Payne
and Inspector Kevin Leong arrived to question Page. They
took a third taped statement from Page, who immediately
recanted his confession. He told the questioners that his con
fession had been a product of confusion, fear, and imagina
tion. He stated that he never saw Bibi after he left Robin
Shaw at Skyline Gate. The interview ended at 9:48 p.m.
Page was left alone in the interview room until 11 :25 p.m.,
when he knocked on the door and told Harris and Lacer
he wanted to talk. The officers spoke with Page until about
1 a.m. and then began the fourth and last taped statement. In
a rambling statement, Page mentioned a number of factors
that had caused him to give a false confession: The officers
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said they found his fingerprints at the scene and were con
vinced he was involved in the killing; the polygraph scared
him; he felt guilty for not having helped Bibi; the officers had
said he would sit in jail and rot away from the inside if he
could not remember. Because of all these factors, the officers
convinced Page that he might have killed Bibi. Consequently,
with the officers' assistance, he "imagined" a scenario in
which he could have killed her.
When asked to explain how he had come up with the details
of the assault story, Page said the "two things" he knew about
the discovery of Bibi's body were that she was found one
quarter mile south of Roberts Park and that at least the bot
tom of her was dressed. He surmised that since the dogs did
not find her, she must have been buried. He also "assumed"
she was found on the east side of the road. Page was arrested
and charged with the murder of Bibi Lee.
At trial, Page testified about how the officers had crafted his
memory by building on images and adding details. When his
memory drew a blank, one of the officers said, "Well, you
might remember after lashing out or going off or exploding."
Page said he had an image of "going off." They asked Page if
he had hit Bibi, and he said he pictured that. They asked if he
kicked her, and he said he could imagine that. They asked if
he had a branch, and he pictured that. They asked if he had a
rock, and he put a rock into the scenario. Page claimed the
process was "like making a movie."
As his final witness, Page called Elliot Aronson,2S a professor
of psychology at the University of California, Santa Cruz, to
testify about the social influence factors that can lead to false
confessions. The trial judge permitted Aronson to testify con
cerning these general principles of social psychology, but did
not allow him to specifically relate these principles to Page's
statements or to give his opinion concerning the reliability of
the confession. According to the court:
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. . . Aronson noted that when a trusted authority figure misleads or
lies to another person, or puts that person under stress, or makes
him feel gUilty or doubt his own perceptions, it throws the other
person off balance and makes him vulnerable to persuasion. More
over, when a person is confronted with what seems like incontro
vertible evidence that contradicts his own senses or memory, the
person will struggle to make sense of the situation.
With respect to Page's interrogation, Aronson found a number of
important factors at work: It was clear that Lacer and Harris were
authority figures; Page seemed to believe they were being com
pletely honest with him, and he seemed to be trying to please them;
however, the officers lied to Page about the fingerprints and the
eyewitness, and Page was struggling to make sense of this informa
tion.
Professor Aronson identified other factors in the taped statements
affecting the reliability of the confession. First, Page seemed to feel
guilty about having left Bibi in the park. According to the profes
sor, Sergeant Lacer "made that gUilt salient, in effect rubbed the
defendant's nose in the guilt." Second, Page exhibited "a lot of
stress and confusion" related to the ordeal of the previous five
weeks. Third, the fact Lacer and Harris did not believe his story
was in itself a very stressful event. Fourth, Page was alone in the
interrogation with no support. And fifth, the police frightened Page
when they told him he would spend the rest of his life in prison
unless he "came up" with something.
According to Professor Aronson, "there is a lot of research in. . .
the field of conformity compliance persuasion that shows that under
these kinds of circumstances, people strive to make sense out of
the discrepancies. They try to construct scenarios that link these
disparate elements together. They're compliant. They tend to tell
people what they think they want to hear, and they're susceptible.
They tend to go along."

Page appealed his conviction on the grounds that Aronson
should have been allowed to specifically discuss the particu
lar elements in the taped statements that indicated the confes
sion was unreliable, and should have been allowed to give his
opinion regarding the overall reliability of the confession.
The California Court of Appeals upheld the trial judge's rul
ing that Aronson could testify only as to "the general psycho
logical factors which might lead to an unreliable confession,
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along with descriptions of the supporting experiments," but
he could not testify regarding either (l) "the particular evi
dence in Page's taped statements which indicated that those
psychological factors were present in this case," or (2) "the
reliability of Page's confession, given the overall method of
interrogation."
Coerc edinternalized
c onfession

There is a semantical gap in the usage of the term "coerced
internalized" confession. In order to distinguish these confessions from the coerced-compliant ones, we have to identify
the suspect as actually coming to believe the false confession
is true. In these cases, capitulation is joined by conversion.
One would therefore expect that recanting either is unlikely
or is possible only after a sufficient amount of counter infor
mation had repersuaded or deprogrammed the suspect. Vrij26
identifies this problem but states that "it is possible that sus
pects who make internalized false confessions in police inter
views only believe during the police interview that they have
committed the crime" (p. 141). We reject this clarification
because it turns every coerced-compliant confession into a
coerced-internalized confession from the perspective of the
police. How can a conscientious police officer know whether
the confession is truly believed at the time? Did Peter Reilly
believe, at least at some level, that he might have killed or
must have killed his mother? A better solution, in our view, is
to require the internalization to survive the police interview
and to last at least until counter social influence forces, or
irrefutable facts, cause a recanting.
A problem with our definition of coerced-internalized confes
sions is that they are difficult to document because, with the
suspect believing himself to be guilty, there are few reasons
why the ultimate truth should later be revealed. The police,
the courts, and even the suspect will consider the matter
settled. There are few incentives to search for a truth all of
the parties claim does not exist.
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Wrightsman and Kassin27 cite the case of Paul Ingram as an'
example of a true coerced-internalized confession. There are
good reasons, however, to reject their choice.
Paul Ingram was accused by his daughters of sexually molest
ing them.28 He was arrested on November 28, 1988, and made
incriminating statements on that same day. Ingram waived his
right to counsel and made further incriminating statements
during the questioning period. As the questioning continued,
the allegations also expanded to involve participation in a
satanic cult and satanic rituals. Concerned about the satanic
cult aspects of the case, prosecutors hired a cult expert, soci
ologist Richard Ofshe, to offer them assistance. Ofshe, who
had at the time been writing on the topic of false confessions,
jumped to the defense side of the case and alleged that
Ingram had been the victim of faulty police interrogation tac
tics, which included sophisticated social influence techniques
used by a psychology professor assisting the police with
Ingram's questioning. Ofshe did more than theorize; he con
ducted an experiment to test the ease with which false memo
ries could be implanted in Ingram. While talking with
Ingram, Ofshe casually suggested the possibility that Ingram
had sex with his own son, claims that had not appeared as
allegations in the case. Soon afterwards, Ingram reported
dreams of sexual involvement with his son. Ofshe testified at
trial that Ingram was another case of poor police interroga
tion methods leading to false confessions. Ingram was never
theless found guilty and was sentenced to prison, where he
remains. As a result of Ofshe's intervention, in July 1989
Ingram recanted his confessions and sought to have his guilty
plea withdrawn. After six days of testimony, including that of
many experts in addition to Of she, the trial judge denied
Ingram's motion. Ingram was sentenced to prison, where he
continues to serve his term. Ofshe, Lawrence Wright, and
others later testified in 1996 at a parole hearing for Ingram,
but their requests for a new trial or for his freedom were
turned down.
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On the surface, the Ingram case appears to satisfy the require
ments for a coerced-internalized confession. However, to
actually satisfy those requirements, it is necessary to demon
strate that Ingram really believed he was guilty but was actu
ally innocent. Does the proof exist?
On the question of Ingram's belief in his own guilt, the evi
dence is strong enough. Ingram made incriminating state
ments on the very first day he was questioned, and he
continued to make incriminating statements throughout the
investigation. He waived counsel and pleaded guilty. He con
tinued to believe in his own guilt until two weeks after he
filed his guilty plea, when he was contacted by Ofshe, who
told him, "You're innocent." Ingram responded, "No, I'm
guiIty."29 Of she then spent time with Ingram, and several
weeks later Ingram recanted. Given the amount of time that
Ingram appeared to sincerely believe in his own guilt, he
would meet one criterion of coerced-internalized.
The other criterion, that Ingram actually may be innocent, is
far more problematic. If Ingram sincerely believes in his own
guilt because he is in fact guilty, this is not a false confession.
To demonstrate that Ingram is an example of a coerced-inter
nalized confession, it will have to be shown that he is in fact
innocent. Unfortunately the evidence points in the opposite
direction.
At the hearing on Ingram's motion to withdraw his gUilty
plea, the trial judge, at the conclusion of all of the evidence
and testimony, concluded that Ingram had committed the sex
ual offenses against his daughters. In his long written opin
ion, the judge made several important points.30 First, he found
that Ingram, who was himself a law enforcement officer and
a friend of the officers who interrogated him, essentially con
fessed very early in the questioning. These statements were
made before the involvement of the psychologist. Ingram
described explicit details, including the means he used to
avoid pregnancy. Second, the judge found Ofshe to be the
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expert with the least credentials and the only one taking the
position that the confession was false. The judge also found
Ofshe's conduct in the case to be quite unusual, including the
experiment he did with Ingram. Ofshe's testimony was unper
suasive according to the judge. Third, no explanation was
provided for why the daughters would lie.
Ingram's guilt was upheld by the Washington Court of
Appeals,31 and federal courts rejected his habeas corpus
collateral attack.32 Ingram was later denied clemency by the
Washington Parole BoardY
The final arguments in support of Ingram's guilt may be
found first in a passage from Ofshe about the Ingram case: "It
is impossible for anyone other than those directly involved to
know whether or not Paul Ingram" is guilty of the crimes.34
Second, with regard to Ofshe's experiment with Ingram, at
the parole hearing Ingram's son Chad spoke for the first time
and recounted instances of being physically and sexually
abused by his father. Of she, without ever speaking to
Ingram's son, announced that the charges by Chad were an
attempt to justify a life that had been a disaster.3s Finally, a
growing literature is calling into question the accuracy of
Ofshe's scholarship, raising the issues of whether his presen
tation of facts is accurate and whether he substitutes his own
beliefs and opinions for facts.36
Voluntaryfalse
confession

A dramatic example of the voluntary false confession
occurred in the aftermath of the tragic kidnapping, and later
the slaying, of the Charles Lindbergh baby in 1932. More
than 200 innocent people confessed to the police that they
were guilty of what was at that time called "the crime of the
century."
Why do people confess to crimes they have not committed?
Vrij37 has suggested six possible explanations: (1) a patholog
ical need for attention, or to enhance self-esteem by the noto
riety; (2) an attempt to relieve guilt or depression about other
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matters by inflicting punishment on themselves; (3) a delu
sional or schizophrenic inability to distinguish fantasy from
fact, so that hearing of a crime makes them believe they com
mitted it; (4) an attempt to protect someone else, such as a
relative, who they believe is the real criminal; (5) an attempt
to obtain a reduced punishment after they conclude that they
cannot prove their own innocence, such as when the police
claim that the evidence of their guilt is conclusive; and (6) an
attempt to hide other facts, whether incriminating or embar
rassing. We might add still another motivation: Some volun
tary false confessors act out o f a misplaced civic
responsibility to be of assistance to the police.
Cases of false confessions of crime are well known to law
enforcement officials. The danger posed by such confessions
is that an innocent person will be sent to prison and perhaps
death, while the guilty party remains free to continue to prey
on society. Police may be fooled by false confessors, espe
cially when the crime is not a high-visibility affair, the con
fessor was not otherwise known to police, and manpower was
unavailable to thoroughly investigate the crime and the con
fession. Under these conditions the confession may be per
ceived as an economically efficient solution of a crime.
Overburdened public defenders may contribute to the prob
lem by not discovering the nature of the false confession and
the existence of the factitious disorder. Overburdened courts
of criminal justice happily accept confessions with only mini
mal inquiry (to ask the defendant if the confession was true
and voluntary) in more than 90% of criminal cases.
Just how serious a problem false confessions are for the legal
system is difficult to gage because of the problems inherent in
proving ultimate innocence. On the one hand, police interroga
tors tend to underestimate the number of false confes
sions. Inbau, Reid & Buckley38 acknowledge that false con
fessions are a problem, but they believe that such confessions
are a product of three impermissible interrogation techniques:
(1) inflicting physical force; (2) threatening physical harm;
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and (3) promising the suspect that if he confesses he can go
free or will receive a light penalty. Noticeably absent from
this list are: (1) the use of extended hours of questioning
without relief; (2) deprivation of food, water and sanitary
facilities; (3) lying and deception as to the purpose of the
questioning; (4) lying and deception as to the nature of the
evidence against the suspect; and (5) the systematic and
extensive manipulation of psychological components of the
suspect's thinking and beliefs. Nevertheless Inbau and his
associates believe that the use of the techniques detailed in
their book will never lead to a false confession. Gudjonsson,39
in the leading text on false confessions, has aptly described
this opinion as "naive."
Also on the "naive" side, but more consistent with popular
belief, are the remarks of an American police official: "There
is a principle in interrogation. A person will not admit to
something they haven't done, short of torture or extreme
duress. No matter how long you are grilled, no matter how
much you are yelled at, you are not going to admit to some
thing you have not done."40 The prevalence of this belief pro
vides a justification for the current admission of expert
testimony on why innocent people may confess to crimes
they never committed and on why innocent people in therapy
may report false memories of horrific events, such as being
molested by their parents, when those events never happened.
Juries are not likely to understand these ideas without such
testimony, because these views expressed by experts run con
trary to widely held community opinions about confessions
and human behavior.
The middle ground on the prevalence of false confessions is
stated by Kassin,41 who estimates that in the United States 35
to 600 confessions a year are false.
Commentators at the other extreme assume that false confes
sions are very frequent, and indeed, as Ofshe and Leo state,
"they happen all the time."42 The reason given for the over-
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whelming occurrence of false confessions is the adoption by
police departments of social psychological techniques of
influence and persuasion that are virtually irresistible.43 This
assumption has been extended to the therapy room, where,
it is asserted, therapists, using the same or similar techniques
of influence as those used by the police, implant false memo
ries that appear as a form of a false confession of facts that
never actually occurred. Furthermore, it is asserted that the
number of therapist-implanted false memories has reached
"epidemic" proportions, which would make therapists more
negatively productive than police departments, since the term
"epidemic" has not been applied to police interrogation prob
lems.
Whatever the actual numbers, false confessions remain a
problem for courts of law. England and Wales have adopted
legislation to protect the subjects of police interrogation by
regulating the nature of the questioning.44
Two other types of falsity, apart from intentional perjury,
have been occupying the courts' attention in recent years.
The first involves the perplexing situations in which there are
false confessions of physical or mental illness, and the second
category includes the hundreds of cases involving the report
and recantation of false memories.
3. Factitious
disorders
and false
confessions
of illness

The Court of Appeals in United States v. Shay4S explained the
role of factitious disorders in legal cases as follows:
Pseudologia fantastica is categorized as a factitious disorder in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed.
1987) ["DSM-III-R"] and is sometimes referred to as Mun
chausen's Disease, named after Baron von Munchausen, who was a
German storyteller who wandered the countryside spinning tall
tales. Pseudologia fantastica is a variant of lying, often character
ized as an extreme form of pathological lying. R. Sharrock and M.
Cresswell, Pseudologia Fantastica: A Case Study of a Man Charged
with Murder, 29 Med.Sci.Law 323, 323 (1989). Unlike "con-men,"
whose lying is for the purpose of some material gain, victims of
this condition present falsifications that are "disproportionate to
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any discernible end." Id. Pseudologues represent fantasies as real
occurrences. "These fantasies often involve dramatic, grandiose,
and exaggerated events consciously acknowledged as false by the
patient, yet presented as truth." Charles W. Dithrich, Pseudologia
Fantastica, Dissociation, and Potential Space, in Child Treatment,
72 IntI.Psycho.Anal. 657, 657 (1991). "External reality is negated
by an enthralling, seductive and exciting inner world in which any
thing is possible." Id. at 658. The gain for the pseudologue could
be ego enhancement or the attention received as a result of the
story . . . . Many lie for no apparent reason, in circumstances
where they have nothing to gain from not telling the truth. Anne
Vaughan, "Believe me-I cannot tell the truth," The Independent,
July 9, 1991, at 13. Pseudologues are also often highly compliant
and suggestible to misleading information. . . . " They are often
histrionic or suggestible types who thrive on attention and lie for a
quick high * * * and don't worry about the consequences."
Vaughan, supra. Furthermore, even when they are confronted with
their lies, many pseudologues are unable to control their lies. . . .
As noted by one doctor, "[ilt is quite common for people suffering
from pseudologia fantastica to turn up at a police station confessing
to a crime they did not commit. Usually these have been high-pro
file, well-publicized cases such as bank robberies. "This group of
pseudologues loves the excitement and power that helping the
police brings. It makes them feel important and they relish all the
attention and fame that they receive from the case * * *.' " Id.

A new kind of false confession is beginning to occupy the
attention of courts of law. In the first category of these cases,
adults present themselves for medical treatment without
revealing that their wounds were self-inflicted. False stories
are told about how the physical harm occurred, or if it
occurred at all. Adults intentionally present themselves to
medical facilities with, in the words of DSM-IV,46
fabrication of subjective complaints (e.g. , complaints of acute
abdominal pain in the absence of any such pain), self-inflicted con
ditions (e.g., the production of abscesses by injection of saliva into
the skin), exaggeration or exacerbation of preexisting general medi
cal conditions (e.g., feigning of grand mal seizure by an individual
with a previous history of seizure disorder), or any combination or
variation of these. (p. 471)
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The DSM-IV refers to these situations as "factitious disor
ders," which are clearly recognized as a mental disturbance.
A significant difficulty for the legal system, and the experts
who testify on these issues, is determining which individuals
are malingering,47 which is not a mental disorder, from which
individuals may be mentally disturbed. As one commentatorS
has noted:
The charge that a claimant is malingering is damning when applied
properly. "Malingering" is not a mental disorder, but a pattern of
behavior in which a person "fake[s] or exaggerat[es] injury or ill
ness in order to get money or various other payoffs. . . . In com
mon parlance it's called goldbricking or shamming." This is to be
distinguished both from somatoform or conversion disorders, in
which emotional instability presents itself as a specific, limited loss
of physical function, and from factitious disorders, in which an
individual intentionally mimics physical or psychological symp
toms in order to gain relief from emotional conflict. (Internal cita
tions omitted)

Another commentator9 has also addressed the complexity of
arriving at an accurate diagnosis in cases where primary and
secondary gains may induce deceptive conduct:
The malingerer should be distinguished from those with genuine
psychopathology, such as those who have various personality disor
ders. These personality disorders include: (1) the uncooperative
patient; (2) the person with factitious disorder; and (3) the person
with mixed malingering and factitious disorder. While malingerers
consciously and volition ally feign illness for some personal gain,
by contrast, "uncooperative patients" have no clear motive for
behaving in such a manner. Uncooperative patients might behave as
they do because they distrust the physicians evaluating them or they
enjoy the power it appears to provide them. Persons with factitious
disorder may have voluntary control over their behavior. Such a
disorder, however, is caused by a psychological problem in which
the individual needs to obtain relief from emotional conflict and
does so by mimicking physical or psychological illness or injury.
This mimicry, therefore, is in a sense without blameworthiness.

The DSM-IV50 describes the difference between malingering
and factitious disorder in the following manner:
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In malingering, the individual also produces the symptoms inten
tionally, but has a goal that is obviously recognizable when the
environmental circumstances are known. For example, the inten
tional production of symptoms to avoid jury duty, standing trial,
or conscription into the military would be classified as malingering.
. . . In contrast, in Factitious Disorder, the motivation is a psycho
logical need to assume the sick role. (p. 471)

The difficulty of making an accurate diagnosis-with more
than a touch of sarcasm directed at the legal system-was
uttered by an expert in a case where, in response to the attor
ney's question as to whether a claimant was a malingerer,
Dr. Unsworth, the expert, responded: "I wouldn't be testify
ing if I didn't think so, unless I was on the other side; then it
would be a post traumatic condition."sl
Friedland52 singles out cases of workers' compensation and
cases where plaintiffs claim to have been injured by defective
products, as legal situations where determinations of truth vs.
intentional lying arise most frequently.
A second category of intentional deception, where again
people would naturally assume that a person is speaking the
truth, occurs in the factitious by proxy situations. In these
cases the sufferer of a factitious disorder is harmful and
deceptive not to himself, but rather to others. In its most
usual appearance, mothers injure their children and then
intentionally lie as to how the child got sick.53
These cases of factitious disorder by proxy might not raise
more than an academic debate in the medical literature, but
the incursion of the diagnosis into courts of law has created
great controversy. In the first-category cases, the claimant
seeks money or attention or the avoidance of an unpleasant
task. The second-category cases, however, raise more signifi
cant possibilities of criminal conviction.54
It is relatively clear that in the legal context, factitious disor
der by proxy cases involve three distinct elements. First, it
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must be proved with facts that the physical and/or mental
harm to the child (or other) was caused by the defendant.55
Second, medical testimony is needed as to whether the defen
dant was suffering from factitious disorder by proxy. Third,
assuming that the defendant did cause the harm and is suffer
ing from the disorder, what should the law do about it?
On this third point, should the fact that the defendant suffers
from the disorder be used to excuse punishment? To reduce
the sentence? To assist in the proof that the defendant caused
the harm (from the fact that the defendant has the disorder,
we infer that the defendant caused the harm)?
Once a medical judgment becomes the basis for a legal
excuse, justification, or defense, controversy will follow.
Mart56 has argued that the disorder is overdiagnosed, espe
cially because of fuzzy criteria. Allison and Roberts57 go fur
ther and state that because "the construction of Munchausen
by Proxy Syndrome follows a pattern we have seen develop
in both witchcraft and hysteria," its very existence as a medi
cal or psychiatric condition is questionable. This controversy
in the medical arena has opened the door to lawsuits against
medical and mental health professionals, who now are being
sued for failing to properly diagnose the disorder or for hav
ing improperly diagnosed the disorder.58 Some law firms have
been advertising that they will sue any professional who uses
a factitious disorder diagnosis. In general, the law remains
hopelessly far from a uniform and cohesive analysis concern
ing whether to recognize, and what to do about, factitious
disorder by proxy.59
There is little doubt that the factitious disorders will be the
next major battleground for massive adversarial battles
involving lawsuits against medical and mental health profes
sionals.
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II.

1. Manufac
turing
plaintiffs:
"You believed
me so now
you should
be liable"

False plaintiffs

Lawsuits against therapists for talking cures were relatively
unheard of until the late 1980s.60 Now hundreds of therapists
have been brought into the courtroom, and lawsuits against
mental health professionals continue to be filed on an
increasing variety of theories.61 One major source of litigation
involves a patient who sues his or her former therapist claim
ing that the diagnosis and treatment were negligent. At the
core of these cases is the claim that the memories expressed
by the patient in therapy were actually implanted by the ther
apist, and that the dissociative disorder the patient was diag
nosed as having was actually iatrogenically created. Plaintiffs
claim that they spent years of time and countless funds
receiving treatments for disorders caused by the therapist.
They further claim that they have not been able to get better
until they completely left the therapist's treatment and later
learned how they had been victimized. In essence, as many
experts have written or testified in court, the therapist is
being sued for believing the patient.
Recanters, like any other patients, may sue therapists for mal
practice. If the treatment by the therapist has been legally
substandard, liability should ensue. Just as people generally
assume that confessors must be telling the truth because why
else would they say what they said, people also assume
that recanters must now be telling the truth because why else
would they say what they said? The concept of false recant
ing seems quite alien to common understanding. Therapists
are at grave legal risk because of this popular misconception.
One explanation for false recanting in therapist cases may be
found in the social influence literature.62 Accusers who are
placed into groups of recanters, or who are heavily influenced
by people who do not believe in repressed memory, may be
persuaded to disavow "memories" that are actually real. Just
as social influences may create false memories, so too may
they create false recanters.63 As Beahrs, Cannell and Gutheil64
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noted, "false memories are more likely to arise from social
influence, either inside or outside of hypnosis or psycho
therapy; intrinsic suggestibility (especially interrogative) and
dissociative potential; and less so, simply from being hypno
tized" (p. 50). The mere fact that a patient disavows formerly
held beliefs does not automatically mean that the recantation
is the truth. Social influence theory makes it clear that if it is
possible to believe that something happened when it never
did, then it is also possible to believe that nothing happened
when something did. It is not clear whether these principles
are symmetrical. In other words, more work must be done to
determine whether it is easier (or harder) to believe the for
mer (false memories) than the latter (false recanting). That
both are possible, however, is quite clear.
Of course, it is unfair and unwise to argue that from the mere
fact that false memories occur in therapy, the therapist should
automatically be liable. It will still be necessary to show that
the false memories are a product of negligent conduct by the
therapist. To meet this burden of proof, the medical records
must clearly show a repetitive and sustained scheme of indoc
trination coupled with a personality trait making the patient
susceptible to this social influence. Elsewhere we have artic
ulated the appropriate legal test for recantor cases involving
claims of social influence.65
2. Litigation
as a mental
disorder

It has been alleged and generally assumed that in the retractor
cases filed against therapists, the plaintiff-retractors did not
get better. This failure to improve is one of the reasons lead
ing to the filing of the lawsuits. In fact, however, this
assumption is not correct.66 In general, retractors do get better
with regard to their dissociative symptoms. Ironically, it is
the fact that they do improve that increases the likelihood of
lawsuits being brought against them. Once the debilitating
dissociative features of the diagnosis recede sufficiently in
treatment to allow the patient to be fully functional, the bor
derline or factitious components of the diagnosis exert more
authority and become paramount motivating factors. The
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elimination of the more pressing and traumatic dissociative
problems creates the need for, and exposes the borderline and
factitious problems to, post-treatment suggestive manipula
tion. As noted by Peter Barach, president of the International
Society for the Study of Dissociation:67
I do think that there are certain styles of treatment (heavily abreac
tive, focusing on alters one at a time, relative avoidance of examin
ing negative transference) that do not get the patient dealing with
the borderline pathology until relatively late in the game, if at all.
. . . If the borderline pathology is dealt with earlier rather than
later, then the patient "quickly" starts to express hatred toward the
therapist and will drop out of treatment rather than face the extreme
disparity between her negative and positive views of the therapist
and of herself (Kernberg described this surpassingly well). In that
situation, the patient probably hasn't been in treatment long enough
to make a good case that she has been damaged by treatment, and
it's unlikely that a suit would go forward. However, if the border
line pathology is Not dealt with until later if at all, then the patient
wants to return to her "loving" family and will shift all of the nega
tive feelings from the family to the therapist to make it possible for
her to return to the bosom of her family. I have referred to this sce
nario as "False Mammary Syndrome."

The appearance of recanting in some legal cases, especially
where sexual conduct is involved, did not begin with the cur
rent round of false memory lawsuits. Recanting is not a new
phenomenon in psychiatry. Our modern concern about
repressed memories and recanting in forensic settings was
anticipated by Erickson as early as in 1938. His article
"Negation or Reversal of Legal Testimony"68 is a fascinating
account of two different instances of provable, fully docu
mented physical and/or sexual abuse that was later denied
(recanted) by the victims.
In the first reported case described by Erickson, two young
girls, 9 and 11 years of age, were found in a brothel run by
their parents when it was raided by the police. The girls
freely gave detailed and explicit descriptions of what had
happened to them in the brothel. Their accounts were corrob
orated by available evidence. After the passage of some
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months their memories began to fade, and ultimately they
claimed they had no memories of ever being in a brothel.
They became annoyed at people who suggested that they had
been in such an awful place, or who suggested that their lov
ing parents would ever do such a hideous thing to them.
According to Erickson, during the first interview the girls
were interested in having a sympathetic listener. By the sec
ond interview, two months later, they no longer had a need to
tell their story, and the details became vague and contradic
tory. The "repugnance" associated with the first interview
was replaced by the girls with "resentment" about their cur
rent physical condition, which included venereal disease. By
the third interview the girls' medical problems had been
cured, they had adjusted to their surroundings, and they were
focused on immediate matters. Consequently they denied
much of the story and had only vague statements about their
past. The final interview, conducted six months after the ini
tial interview, was the most difficult, because the girls
resented talking about the past and trivialized the whole
experience ("some bad men came to the house, but nothing
bad happened"). The girls expressed warmth for their parents
and disgust that the state authorities had invaded their lives.
Erickson found that once their confidence had been obtained,
with careful questioning the girls could provide much of the
initial detail, only they now claimed the information they first
gave was untruthful. However, Erickson noted that "they
seemed to have no real recollection of the whole experience
as an actual happening in their own lives."
The second case described by Erickson involved a woman
who was spending a racy evening with a criminal when they
had a serious automobile accident. The criminal made no
effort to rescue the young woman, and she was severely
burned before rescuers were able to save her. At the trial of
the criminal, the young woman testified "with much bitter
ness and hatred," and her story was corroborated by the res-
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cuers and by the criminal himself. Eight months after the
conviction, the young woman attempted to have the case
reversed on the grounds that she had lied. The criminal
claimed that she had in fact told the truth and that he did not
want his relatively short sentence reversed for a new trial that
could produce a longer sentence, especially because he had
already admitted his guilt. The young woman now sincerely
believed the criminal had exerted every effort to save her,
efforts she described in full, though they had never occurred.
Erickson wrote that cases of recanting forensic witnesses
were not unknown to psychiatry in 1938 . They represent
the not unusual legal situation in which a female, after sexual
usage, testifies first against the offending male and then, after a
period of suffering, reverses her beliefs and attitudes to testify sin
cerely in his behalf. This identity is manifest primarily in: (1) the
highly pleasurable, exciting initial development of the experience;
(2) the sudden complete transformation of this pleasurable situa
tion into one of extreme terror, physical helplessness, and pain; and
(3) the final evolution into a situation of long-continued suffer

ing and general helplessness.
According to Erickson, these cases have a fundamental rela
tionship to everyday repression of unpleasant or disagreeable
experiences. He concluded that "in all probability the initial
psychic dynamism in these cases, as in instances occurring in
daily life, was the primary repression of the unpleasant
affects arising not only from the traumatic aspects of the
experience but from the girls' own gUilty pleasurable partici
pation."
Erickson's article suggests that psychodynamic forces might
account for recanting where the underlying facts are true.
Although the mental mechanisms underlying the recanting
were not well known or understood at the time, Erickson's
insight that recanting may be the outgrowth of unconscious
mental motivations is now finding support among mental
health forensic specialists studying the modern recanting
cases, as several articles in this issue suggest.
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If the plaintiff-patient can overcome these two significant
hurdles-evidence that the recanting is itself psychodynami
cally influenced or socially influenced-then the third possi
bility is present, that the recanting is true and the "memories"
were indeed false. This possibility must be taken seriously,
because recanting often follows undue influence, as the
brainwashing literature has shown.69 Thus, in recanting cases,
the defense must have the opportunity, with expert opinion in
support when available, that the plaintiff's recanting is more
likely than not unreliable because (1) there is a clear pattern
of post-therapy suggestive influences leading to the recanting
or (2) the borderline or factitious aspects of the plaintiff's
personality were triggered when the dissociative disorders
were improved or cured.
3. A study of
recanters
in 30 high
visibility
therapist
lawsuits

Diagnoses

In the past five years one of us (DB) has served as defense
expert witnesses in 30 malpractice cases in which the plain
tiff alleged that the defendant therapist(s) negligently
implanted false abuse memories and/or a false dissociative
identity disorder. These 30 cases constitute a substantial
database. Previous studies of false memory retractors have
suffered from being limited to plaintiff self-reports given
after association with pro-false-memory advocacy groupS.70
In contrast, our study used considerable evidence collected as
part of a lawsuit, i.e., deposition and trial testimony of plain
tiff and defense lay and expert witnesses, extensive medical
records, and collateral family history evidence. There is an
obvious sampling bias in that this material was collected in
serving as an expert witness for the defense. Nevertheless,
this study, we believe, is the first attempt to look at the actual
data of a large sample of retractor cases, and despite its limi
tations, we think the results are useful.
One of the most striking findings in our sample was that
the great majority of the retractors had been given multiple,
co-morbid psychiatric diagnoses. Only one case (6.7%) had
been given a single psychiatric diagnosis. A total of 80% had
been given four or more major psychiatric diagnoses, and
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60% met the criteria for six or more co-morbid psychiatric
diagnoses, made and confirmed by two or more therapists
over the course of the treatment. Over the entire course of
treatment(s), the multiple diagnoses given to each retractor
typically included a major affective diagnosis, an anxiety dis
order, posttraumatic stress disorder, a major dissociative
disorder diagnosis (dissociative identity disorder (DID) or
dissociative disorder not otherwise specified (DDNOS)), at
least one Axis II personality disorder diagnosis, most com
monly borderline or mixed personality disorder, one or more
major addiction (e.g., chemical dependency and/or an eating
disorder), sometimes somatization disorder, and/or a sexual
desire disorder.

A diagnosis of DID had been made in 37% of the cases and
of DDNOS in another 53% of the cases. It is perhaps no acci
dent that the majority of retractors had been given a diagnosis
of DDNOS instead of DID. They presented with some symp
toms of a dissociative identity disorder, notably alter behav
ior, at some point in the overall course of their illness, but
presented in a way that fell short of definitively meeting the
DID diagnostic criteria. Thus the question as to the legiti
macy of the alter behavior or of a full DID diagnosis had
been considered at some point in the overall treatment.
Through a post-hoc chart review, clinically significant facti
tious behavior was found in 33% of the cases, although
defendant clinicians had not always detected the pattern of
deception. Factitious behavior typically overlapped with the
dissociative disorder diagnosis. Given the high prevalence
rate of factitious behavior in the overall retractor sample, fac
titious behavior may be a more important alternative explana
tion for retractor behavior than iatrogenesis (High, this issue).
Claiming false memories simply may be another manifesta
tion of factitious, attention-seeking behavior from the courts
and pro-false-memory advocacy groups.
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Overall it was common to find five to seven co-morbid psy
chiatric diagnoses existing in the same patient. Since many of
these patients represented the extreme of psychiatric severity,
a poor prognosis would be expected regardless of the treat
ment rendered, including treatment well within the standard
of care.
Possible flaws
in the treatment

We began this analysis with the assumption that such mal
practice cases usually result from "bad therapies." This was
not at all the case for the great majority of the 30 retractor
cases. Several cases involved minor boundary transgressions
(but typically not allegations of sexual misconduct). Two of
the 30 cases involved (non-sexual) touch, and another an
alleged sexualized form of touch, but not sexual misconduct.
Two cases involved extratherapeutic contact. For example, in
one case a suicidal patient had been prematurely dismissed
from the hospital. The therapist let the patient stay at the
therapist's house for several days, where soothing physical
contact was given.
Some of the cases (13.3%) involved complications over ter
mination, but only one involved allegations of patient aban
donment (by a therapist hospitalized for psychiatric reasons).
Seven percent of the cases involved billing disputes, typically
involving a borderline patient alleging some dissatisfaction
with treatment and refusing to pay an outstanding debt to the
therapist. Three of the cases (10%) had involved flawed col
lateral patient involvements: exorcism of alter personalities
by ministers or deprogrammers.
Contrary to the bad-therapy hypothesis, the main finding was
that the great majority of the cases adhered to a generally
accepted model of phase-oriented trauma treatment, with rea
sonable care given to treatment frame issues. While memory
processing, not always memory recovery, was a component
of such treatment, the typical treatment plan was complex
and multimodal, with a variety of broad-based treatment
goals at each stage of treatment. Treatment goals tended to
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shift flexibly as the patient material shifted over the course of
treatment. Contrary to the position taken by plaintiff experts,
none of the 30 cases could be classified narrowly as "memory
recovery therapy,"71 and none had a single-minded focus on
recovering abuse memories. When new abuse memories were
reported, the medical record often made it clear that the
memory had been self-reported by the patient and not sug
gested by the therapist. Later, after encounters with pro-false
memory (mis)information, the patient came to misattribute
the source of his/her abuse memory to the defendant therapist
and forgot that it had been self-reported, sometimes being
recovered outside the context of therapy.
The most surprising finding was that the great majority of
therapists being sued for allegedly implanting memories were
following widely available models for trauma treatment well
within the standard of care. A total of 83% had adhered to
some version of a phase-oriented trauma treatment model,72
and another 7% had followed conventional psychodynamic
treatment without a trauma focus.
Pre-therapy
influences

In nearly half (43%) of the 30 cases a defendant therapist was
sued for allegedly implanting false memories of abuse and/or
a false dissociative disorder even where the fact pattern
clearly showed that the abuse memories and/or the dissocia
tive condition was well established prior to the onset of the
treatment by the defendant. Two high-profile cases illustrate
this fact.
In Carl v. Peterson et al. 73 the plaintiff sued some of the inpa
tient staff at Spring Shadows Glen Hospital for allegedly
implanting false memories of abuse and ritual abuse and a
false dissociative identity disorder. Only the inpatient psy
chologist, Judith Peterson, and the third inpatient psychiatrist,
Gloria Keraga, but not the first two inpatient psychiatrists,
also were sued. The fact pattern showed that Lynn Carl first
began reporting recovered memories of childhood abuse and
later ritual abuse concurrent with her five-year outpatient
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psychiatric treatment. She also developed progressive disso
ciative symptoms, including alter behavior, during that inter
val, as was observed by both the outpatient psychiatrist and
the family therapist and confirmed by an independent consul
tant. She was referred to the inpatient unit for major dissocia
tive disorders at Spring Shadows Glen Hospital because
she had already met the diagnostic criteria for dissociative
identity disorder, as determined by an independent consul
tant. It defies logic that the plaintiff sued specifically Peter
son and Keraga for allegedly implanting false abuse
memories and a false dissociative disorder when the medical
record of both the outpatient psychotherapy and the family
therapy consistently documented the abuse memories and
major dissociative symptoms clearly prior to any treatment
rendered by the defendants. Yet neither the prior treating out
patient psychiatrist nor the family therapist-or, for that mat
ter, the first two inpatient psychiatrists-was sued. The jury
decided against the defendants for implanting these pre-exist
ing memories and the dissociative disorder and awarded
nearly $5 million.
Similarly, in Burgess v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke 's Medical
Center et at.,74 the plaintiff sued her treating psychiatrist,
Bennett Braun, and the Rush-Presbyterian Hospital for
allegedly implanting false memories of childhood abuse and
false dissociative identity disorder diagnoses. The medical
record clearly documented that the plaintiff had reported pro
gressively more complex abuse memories and had manifested
many of the clinical features of dissociative identity disorder,
including alter behavior, in her outpatient psychotherapy in
Iowa. Because her abuse memories and multiple personality
features were already well developed, she was referred by her
outpatient therapist to the specialty inpatient unit for disso
ciative disorders at Rush-Presbyterian Hospital in Chicago
and to Dr. Braun, a well-known authority on mUltiple person
ality disorder. How could Dr. Braun have created, through
iatrogenic therapeutic suggestion, false memories and a false
DID diagnosis if they were already present before his
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involvement in the case? Yet despite this absurd fact pattern,
the insurance carrier settled against the defendants for close
to $11 million.
Post
therapeutic
suggestive
influences

There is a certain hypocrisy in the retractor claim that defen
dant therapists have allegedly implanted false memories. The
plaintiff would like the court to believe that slhe was espe
cially vulnerable to suggestive influences in the treatment
rendered by the defendants that caused the development of
false memories of abuse that never happened and/or a false
dissociative disorder diagnosis that slbe never had. Yet in all
30 cases the plaintiff failed to report his or her vulnerability
to post-therapeutic suggestive influences that might have
been operative in the shaping of the retraction belief itself.
The most striking finding from our analysis was that signifi
cant post-therapeutic suggestive influences associated with
the development of the retraction belief could be identified
in every one of the 30 cases. Given that the medical record
failed to document any pattern of allegedly therapeutic sug
gestive influences causing false abuse memories in the great
majority of these cases, an interesting hypothesis arising from
these data is that post-therapeutic suggestive influences are at
least strong, and often are more compelling in their influence
in shaping the retraction belief than any therapeutic practices
might have been in allegedly contributing to false beliefs
about abuse that allegedly never happened. The overwhelm
ing conclusion from these data is that most retraction beliefs
are not a function of the person correcting a previously dis
torted or mistaken recollection of personal history, but rather
are the result of a complex pattern of systematic post-thera
peutic suggestive influences.
In analyzing these 30 cases we were able to identify a number
of often overlapping post-therapeutic suggestive influences,
including exposure to pro-false-memory information; patient
networks; family influences; treatment influences occurring
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after treatment by the defendant therapists; and legal influ
ences.
A major source of shaping retraction beliefs was exposure to
false-memory information. Some false-memory proponents
have argued that exposure to The Courage to Heal and other
self-help books can contribute to the development of false
memories about abuse that never happened.75 But pro-false
memory books, such as The Myth of Repressed Memories,
Making Monsters, Confabulations, and Victims of Memory76
are equally suggestive, unless we believe that suggestive
influences are limited exclusively to what the therapist does
in therapy.
In our analysis of these 30 cases, significant exposure to
false-memory (mis)information occurred in the great majority
of the cases and had a significant impact on the progressive
shaping of retraction beliefs. Media exposure was a signifi
cant factor in 33% of the retractors. For example, at least two
plaintiffs testified that a 1993 pro-false-memory article in the
Houston Chronicle contributed to their developing significant
doubts about their previous treatment (Roome v. Memorial
City; Romoser v. Memorial City), as did an article in Vanity
Fair for another plaintiff (Shanley v. Peterson et al.).n
In at least two cases consultations provided by pro-false
memory experts were critical in causing plaintiffs to change
their minds. In Christianson v. Strom and Trones v. Strom78
two cousins brought a complaint to the church following
recovery of abuse memories of their uncle, a church minister,
who had allegedly taken down their pants in a locked bath
room and possibly molested them as children. During an
exhaustive church mediation process, the uncle never denied
the acts, but simply said he failed to remember them. Never
theless he considered offering a partial apology, which might
have settled the matter. However, the uncle was then inter
viewed by a known false-memory expert for a single consul
tation session. In the very brief single-session interview the
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"expert" determined that the uncle was "not a sexual
offender," that he had never abused his nephews, and that the
recovered memories were "false." He offered the opinion that
the uncle should sue the therapists for allegedly implanting
false memories, which the uncle subsequently did. In Strom v.
Christianson et al. ,19 based on the idea "implanted" by the
false-memory consultant, the uncle sued both of his nephews
along with their respective therapists. The third-party suit
against the therapists was eventually dismissed by the court,
and the respective suits by the uncle and nephews were
settled.
In Carl v. Peterson et al.80 plaintiff Lynn Carl terminated her
nearly two-year inpatient treatment at a specialty unit for dis
sociative disorders having achieved at least partial integration
of her alter personalities. During her subsequent half-way
house treatment in another part of the country, she eventually
had a consultation with a noted false-memory expert, Paul
McHugh, at the recommendation of her then therapist.
According to the documentation in the medical record, in a
brief interview the consultant determined that she never was
abused and never had DID. He further advised "before she
considered legal action against her former hospital that she
first establish a mode of life that could be evaluated favor
ably by the court system."81 There is no evidence that these
so-called pro-false-memory experts ever sought independent
corroboration that the previously reported abuse memories
were indeed false, and it is doubtful that they ever made a
chart review of all previous treatment before rendering these
impressively quick opinions.
Influence by other patients and disaffected parties also played
a significant role in the development of retraction beliefs in
20% of these cases. Mary Shanley 's deposition testimony
(Shanley v. Peterson et al.),82 for example, revealed that she
had developed contact with other high-profile retractors
who had also sued their therapists-Lynn Carl, Lucy Abney,
Patricia Burgus, and Laura Pasley. According to testimony,
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one of these retractors helped her prepare the "chronology"
of her treatment history for the law firm representing her. In
Burgess v. Burgoyne83 three college students who had all par
ticipated in both individual and group treatment for abuse
with the same therapist met independently, on more than one
occasion, sometime after termination. The result was a deci
sion to jointly sue their former therapist as a team. At least
one of these girls had been given false-memory books to read
by her attorney, following which she met other former
patients seeing the same therapist and convinced them to join
her suit. Lynn Carl's initial negative reappraisal of her former
inpatient DID treatment began after a disaffected nurse for
merly employed at Spring Shadows Glen, not working on her
unit, c ontacted her unsolicitedly about a complaint she
wished to make against the hospital. This former employee
became the star surprise witness at the civil trial wherein the
jury awarded Carl nearly $5 million. However, cross-exami
nation of this same witness during the criminal trial against
Peterson revealed that the former employee had misstated
some of the facts.
What do these data tell us? That sometimes litigious patients,
plaintiff attorneys, and other individuals intentionally solicit
other former patients in order to influence them. In some of
the Houston and Wisconsin cases, expanding networks of
plaintiffs have emerged, each of whom influences and rein
forces the others' retraction beliefs to provide support and
justification to follow through with lawsuits against the same
therapist or small group of therapists.
Unfortunately a fair portion of retraction beliefs were also
influenced by therapists who had seen the patients after the
treatment had been rendered by the defendants. Often these
subsequent therapists accepted the patient's complaints about
former therapists at face value, even where it was clear that a
borderline patient might have developed an unrealistically
negative perspective about that treatment based on borderline
splitting. The medical record of at least some of these thera-
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pists showed a clear pro-false-memory bias, or at least a neg
ative bias about the former treatment. Yet in nearly every one
of these cases, the subsequent therapists developed these
beliefs without having either talked with the former therapist
or reviewed the previous medical records. Rarely did we find
evidence of a "neutral stance" as recommended in the 1 993
APA Task Force on Memory.84
In Hess v. Fernandez85 the patient initially began to question
her former treatment after her insurance carrier recommended
a treatment review in order to continue coverage. The consul
tant, a noted expert on factitious behavior, opined that the
focus on memory work had resulted in a deterioration in
functioning, not because the patient lacked a dissociative
diagnosis, but because her pattern of factitious behavior and
need to adopt the sick role had complicated the treatment
course. In Downing v. McDonough86 a subsequent therapist
took the borderline patient's complaints about her former
therapist at face value and accepted the patient's refusal to let
her contact the former therapist to gain his perspective on the
treatment, thereby dangerously reinforcing the borderline
splitting and transference distortions of the patient. In several
other cases negative reappraisals of former treatments by
defendants were directly attributed to reviewing that treat
ment with a subsequent therapist who reinforced the negative
appraisal based on the patient's self-report alone, without
seeking any corroboration.
Family influences were also a main contributor to the devel
opment of false-memory retraction beliefs. In Abney v. Metro
National87 the patient had been subjected to pressure by her
husband to relinquish her abuse belief after their child alleged
abuse by him and a mandated CPS report had been filed. In
Hess v. Fernandez88 the patient's husband, the mayor of the
local town, had disclosed at a Sexual Awareness Rally that
his wife had an abuse background and mUltiple personality
disorder. Later, after a potentially embarrassing incident in
which the police were called to his home for an alleged
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domestic violence incident, the husband contacted a lawyer
and pressed for a malpractice suit against the therapist for
implanting the abuse memories and dissociative disorder. The
possibility that these acts might have served to clear his name
and his political career cannot be ruled out.
Persistent family-of-origin pressure played an important role
in about one-third of these cases (30%). In Marietti v. Kluft9
a patient alleging childhood abuse by her currently estranged
father was visited by him in the hospital to "talk sense" into
her, and her estranged sister also tried to contact her on a reg
ular basis. The patient eventually retracted, reconciled with
her family (who bought her a house), and sued the consultant
for confirming the diagnosis of DID. In Cragun & Cragun v.
PhillipS90 the same therapist saw four sisters who had contin
uous or recovered memories of abuse allegedly by the father.
Although the youngest sister had doubts about her recovered
memories, all four sisters sued the parents in a civil suit for
damages arising from the alleged childhood abuse. Later the
youngest sister retracted after contact with her family. She
moved back into the family-of-origin home. Contradicting
her previous sworn deposition testimony, she then joined her
parents against her three sisters in a suit against the therapist.
Some of these patients with chronically deteriorating courses
over a number of years had become estranged from their
spouses and children due to frequent hospitalizations, self
harmful and suicidal behaviors, switching to alter personali
ties in front of the family, reporting bizarre abuse to family
members, etc. A powerful motivation contributing to the
development of a retraction belief was a custody battle. If a
former therapist could be blamed for the long-standing pat
tern of dysfunction, which disappeared upon retraction, then
this strategy might be credible to the courts in justifying visi
tation or custody of children previously lost in a separation or
divorce. For example, Lynn Carl hadn't seen her children in
two and a half years. The development of false-memory
beliefs became a catalyst for the reunification of Lynn with
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her former husband and her children, all of whom subse
quently joined the lawsuit against the defendant therapists. In
Smiley v. Remuda Ranch91 the patient, who had consented at
one point to making teaching tapes as a classic example of
the DID diagnosis and its treatment, eventually retracted her
belief that she had DID in the context of an attempt to win
custody or visitation of her estranged children. In Taylor v.
Fairbanks92 the husband sued his wife's therapist along with
his own therapist for allegedly implanting memories of ritual
abuse in both of them, after the estranged wife left the state
with the children to live elsewhere.
Outright coaching by attorneys and related legal influences as
a significant contributor to the development of retraction
beliefs are difficult to assess because of the attorney-client
privilege. In Hess v. Fernandez93 the plaintiff admitted that
her attorney had supplied her with books by Loftus and Ofshe
and that these had been important in forming her retraction
beliefs. The college girl who met with two other former
patients in her group therapy to loop them into her lawsuit
also worked with that same attorney in Burgess v. Burgoyne.94
In Turner v. Honkers the plaintiff hoped for a large sum of
money from a legal suit she brought against a company after
a truck had run into her. In part she hoped this money might
pay for her considerable medical expenses arising from her
PTSDIDID treatment. The attorneys and expert witnesses for
the company subpoenaed her medical records. They testified
that her psychiatric treatment was "below the standard of care
because it had reconstructed a history of abuse and suggested
MPD." They also added that this treatment had nothing to do
with damages arising from the accident. Disillusioned that
she had not received what she felt was due based on this tes
timony, she began to negatively reevaluate her former treat
ment. A subsequent therapist reinforced her developing
retraction beliefs by taking her complaints at face value and
never reviewing the previous treatment either by means of the
medical record or talking with the therapists. In Jones v.
Hutchins96 the patient saw a therapist and recovered memo-
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ries of abuse. She filed a civil suit against her parents for the
alleged abuse. The first attorney failed to do anything with
the suit for over a year. She dismissed that attorney. The
second attorney proceeded with the suit through the dis
covery stage but then dropped the case. She then contacted
a third attorney. She was given information that she would
never make any money suing her parents for abuse and
that she would have a better chance if she sued her therapist
for implanting false abuse memories. She did this, even
though she had to contradict her previous oath at deposition
testimony in the suit against her parents in order to sue her
therapist.97
Some of these cases may represent patients with an antisocial
personality diagnosis who saw profit in suing a former thera
pist, or factitious patients needing to file a suit in order to get
attention as from previous care-givers. In Romoser v. Memo
rial City98 the plaintiff had a long history of antisocial behav
iors dating back to childhood, including a history of
embezzlement at worksites. After suits by other retractors
had received considerable press in the local Houston news,
the plaintiff filed a similar suit. The question arises as to
whether such suits represent another way of being "on the
take," now bolstered by seemingly sophisticated false
memory arguments. In Rapshaw v. Tendlef19 a thorough chart
review showed that the plaintiff had a long history of lying
about medical and psychiatric symptoms and also of making,
then retracting, false abuse allegations.
We could give many more examples, but from this study
and other cases we have examined the point is clear. False
memory retraction beliefs, and the lawsuits that arise from
them, develop out of a complex set of (1) patient motivations
(seeking custody or family reconciliation, antisocial profit
seeking, or factitious attention-seeking) and (2) social influ
ences, including systematic exposure to pro-false-memory
(mis)information, family-of-origin and current family pres
sure to retract, subsequent therapists who naively reinforce
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patients' disgruntlement with previous therapists, and out
right coaching by pro-false-memory consultants and attor
neys. None of the 30 retraction cases fits the profile of a
patient being misled in treatment and subsequently correcting
the misperceptions, as false-memory proponents have implied.
In contrast, these retractors had been subjected to multiple
post-therapeutic suggestive influences, not the least of which
included systematic exposure to false-memory information,
and the combination of which served to radically reshape and
reinforce the patient's belief that a former therapist had com
mitted malpractice by implanting false abuse memories
andlor a false DID diagnosis.
There is a certain hypocrisy here. Plaintiff expert witnesses,
who have testified that defendant therapists have allegedly
implanted false memories in patients, seem remarkably obliv
ious to the suggestive effects of their own writings, public
presentations, and testimony. If therapeutic malpractice is
said to occur whenever a patient develops abuse memories in
treatment and later retracts them, is it scientific or legal mal
practice when retraction beliefs are shaped by exposure to
pro-false-memory information supplied by false-memory sci
entists, pro-false-memory expert witnesses, or attorneys?
III.

Conclusion

The natural belief that if people say things contrary to their
best interests, then those things must be true, is too narrow a
perception about human conduct and motivation. Courts of
law, especially in the last 25 years, have increasingly consid
ered cases of false confessions and the reasons for them.
Expert testimony concerning why people falsely confess is
routinely admitted into evidence.
A similar belief, that retractors must be telling the truth, has
not been subjected to the same type of correction as has the
false-confession cases. It was only until after a sufficient
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number of retractor cases had accumulated that patterns in
their presentations could be seen. Although many of the cases
involving patients suing their therapists have claimed that
iatrogenic social influence is the only plausible explanation
for the dissociative disorder and the allegedly false beliefs, it
has only recently been perceived that the social influence
forces at work after the conclusion of the therapy are espe
cially vital in evaluating the claims of the patients that their
retracted memory is now in fact true. One major hurdle that
has obfuscated the picture, and continues to do so, is the
shield of the attorney-client privilege. When the patient sues
the therapist, the patient waives the psychotherapist-patient
privilege; therefore everything that happened in therapy is
discoverable. But the patient does not waive the attorney
client privilege; therefore post-therapy influences by attor
neys have been very hard to document fully. It may be that
if patients want to sue on the basis of retracted memories,
they should be held to waive the attorney-client privilege for
any information relevant to post-therapy social influence
and indoctrination. The privilege would remain for legal
strategies, etc.
Even more recent than the recognition of post-therapeutic
social influences, the exact roles played by borderline and
factitious disorders have not yet been fully appreciated.
This article has presented the most comprehensive study to
date attempting to analyze the complex issues surrounding
retraction. As some of the papers in this journal suggest,
other researchers are reaching similar conclusions about the
importance of isolating and examining psychodynamic and
social influences that were present prior to the retraction.
For court cases in which retraction is an issue, we make the
following suggestions. First, a thorough examination of the
medical records should be made to discover if the therapy
was unduly suggestive. Second, a careful review of the treat
ment should be undertaken to see if borderline andlor facti-
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tious disorders were present. Third, a close look at any post
treatment social influences is essential, preferably by an
expert in social influence or persuasion. In this regard, the
attorney-client privilege should be deemed waived for dis
covery of facts relating to social influences applied to the
patient-client. Fourth, expert testimony on post-treatment
social influences should be admissible in court. If a pretrial
Frye or Daubert-Kumho hearing is involved, an expert in
social influence should not be permitted to testify about such
influences in therapy unless there is also an expert qualified
to testify about such influences after treatment. Thus either
110 opinion testimony about social influences is admitted, or
opinion testimony about both in-therapy and post-therapy
influences is admitted.
For centuries people have pondered the question "What is
truth?" Perhaps we can now come closer to finding an answer
by carefully examining the reverse question, "What is decep
tion?"
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